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This paper investigates how speculative housebuilders determine the speed at which approved 
housing sites are developed. It finds that where competition for land is intense, housebuilders must 
assume the highest possible sale prices to make winning bids for sites. Such bids are viable only 
because the release of land is restricted by the planning system, while the release of homes is 
managed on a site-by-site basis by builders to achieve the target sales rates underpinning earlier 
land bids. These factors have combined to encourage caution about the capacity of local housing 
markets to ‘absorb’ new-build supply. Even if the planning system released substantially more land, 
it may take some time before housebuilders responded by building out faster. While the research 
predates the recent collapse in speculative housebuilding, it is argued that these findings are likely 






What determines the speed at which approved housing sites are developed? In a market economy, 
the temptation to see this as an issue of construction efficiency must be avoided. Instead, it is 
essentially an economic issue since housebuilders will not wish to produce new homes faster than 
they can be sold. Conventional wisdom among housebuilders emphasises that the finite annual 
capacity of local housing markets to absorb newly built homes determines the speed of 
construction. As a rule of thumb, a common target within the industry is to aim to sell an average 
of roughly one unit a week from each sales outlet and thus to programme construction to deliver 
the necessary flow of newly built homes. 
 
Such conventional wisdom can become embedded in the culture of an industry and transmitted 
into the decision-making processes of the planning system. It demands critical challenge on two 
grounds. First, by drawing attention primarily to the quantity of new build supply, it masks 
important questions around the price of that supply. Since quantity and price are interrelated, it is 
important to ask whether local housing markets could achieve higher new-build sales rates and 
thus faster construction, if new-build prices were lower than those of second hand property. 
Secondly, ‘market capacity’ needs to be viewed as essentially a ‘commercial construct’ contingent 
on the particular set of relationships between the state and the market that currently delineate 
speculative housebuilding provision. This raises the issue of how far the concept of market capacity 
is open to influence from the planning system. 
 




These matters form the focus of the paper. In the next section, we review the research context 
before explaining our method in Section 3. We present the findings of our empirical research in 
Section 4, and set out the conclusions and implications of the paper in Section 5. 
 
2. THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
2.1 The speculative housebuilding industry 
 
The vast majority of new homes completed in Britain since the early 1980s have been built by the 
speculative housebuilding industry. In the decade to 2007/08, it was responsible for 88% of all 
housing completions (DCLG, 2009). The industry is dominated by a small number of very large 
firms, with 83% of its 2006 output produced by only 30 companies and 58% by the ten largest 
(Calcutt, 2007). Despite this, after a detailed market study, the Office of Fair Trading (2008) 
controversially concluded that there was little evidence of competition problems in the delivery of 
new homes. Yet, only four of the top ten companies listed by Calcutt for 2000 remain in existence 
as separate companies in 2008 – a reflection of the takeovers and mergers that continue to 
characterise the industry. 
 
Speculative housebuilders are geared to mass production, with widespread use made of standard 
house types (Hooper and Nicol, 1999) and only limited ‘opportunity space’ conceded to architects 
and urban designers (Tiesdell and Adams, 2004). The industry has been variously accused of lack 
of innovation (Ball, 1999; Barlow, 1999) poor customer focus (Barker, 2004) and scant interest in 
environmental sustainability (Barlow and Bhatti, 1997). More recent evidence suggests improved 
customer satisfaction (Calcutt, 2007) and much greater engagement with the broader sustainability 
and climate change agenda, especially among the most pro-active companies (WWW et al., 2008). 
In the past ten years, following the Government’s 1998 adoption of a 60% brownfield target for 
England, most major housebuilders have also switched the focus of their activities from greenfield 
to brownfield sites, with some of the leading housebuilders becoming urban regeneration 
specialists (Karadimitriou, 2005). However, significant concerns remain, such as those around the 
industry’s commitment to energy efficiency (House of Commons Environmental Audit 
Committee, 2005) and design quality (CABE, 2007). 
 
Ball (2006), who compared the housebuilding industries of seven leading industrialised countries, 
found that the UK is exceptional because of restricted land supply in growth areas and the 
consequent greater emphasis given to the repair and upgrade of existing homes. Golland and 
Boelhouwer (2002), who contrasted housing market systems in the Netherlands and UK from 
1975 to 1997, also emphasised the importance of land supply in explaining why the industry’s 
structure and organisation differ significantly between the two countries. Whereas the public sector 
played the major role in land supply in the Netherlands, the UK speculative housebuilding industry 
has long depended on securing its own access to land. 
 
It should therefore be emphasised that the UK speculative housebuilding industry has a distinctive 
structure of building provision, a term coined by Ball (1998, 1513) to refer “to the contemporary 
network of relationships associated with the provision of particular types of building at specific 
points in time. Those relationships are embodied within the organisations associated with that type 
of building provision, and they may take a market or a non-market form. `Provision’ encompasses 
the whole gamut of development, construction, ownership and use.” Our argument in this paper 
is that the speed at which approved housing sites can be developed and more specifically, the 
notion of finite market capacity in any area, are context-specific matters rather than ones of general 
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principle. Since they reflect the particular structure of British housebuilding provision, they 
demand critical appraisal rather than mere acceptance. 
 
2.2 State-market relations in housebuilding 
 
One important feature of the British structure of housebuilding provision is the tight control 
exercised by the planning system on access to building land. Unlike commercial and industrial 
developers, housebuilders use land extensively and devote much of their energies to capturing this 
essential raw material well in advance. While some have suggested that land banking by 
housebuilders can sometimes amount to land hoarding (RTPI, 2007), others have linked the scale 
of financial resources needed to capture extensive supplies of land to the increased concentration 
of capital within the British industry (Ball, 1983). There has also been much debate on the extent 
to which planning restrictions on land supply lead to higher house prices, with the recent work of 
Bramley (2007), CPRE (2007) and Cheshire (2008) providing contrasting contributions on 
whether, and to what extent, house price inflation would weaken and affordability improve, if 
much higher levels of housing development were to be permitted. 
 
One particularly controversial aspect of relations between planning and housebuilders is the extent 
to which market-based information should inform, and in the view of some critics (see, for 
example, Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005) even drive planning policies. The concept of a readily 
available five-year housing land supply and the introduction of joint land availability studies 
undertaken by planners and housebuilders can be traced back to Michael Heseltine’s time as 
Secretary of State for the Environment in the early 1980s. One relevant consideration introduced 
by government policy in England at that time was “authorities’ views of the likely number of 
completions on the site in each year of the study period” (DOE, 1984, Annex A, para 6065). This 
has evolved over the years to the statement in the latest English good practice guidance (DCLG, 
2007, para 40) that: “A site is considered achievable for development where there is a reasonable 
prospect that housing will be developed on the site at a particular point in time. This is essentially 
a judgement about the economic viability of a site, and the capacity of the developer to complete 
and sell the housing over a certain period.” 
 
The speed at which approved housing sites are developed has become an important policy issue, 
nationally and locally. At the national level, the Government’s ambition to see 3 million new homes 
built in England by 2020 requires the private sector to produce and sell its output at a certain 
speed2. If sites are developed more slowly than this, the Government’s target will not be met. At 
the local level, planning authorities are expected to allocate enough land to enable houses to be 
built within the required timescale. But if each allocated site is developed more slowly than the 
planning authority had assumed, more housing sites may need to be allocated to achieve the 
required level of development within that timescale. 
 
Recent controversy generated by the Middlesbrough Core Strategy Development Plan Document 
illustrates this well and demonstrates the importance of ‘build-out’ rates and notions of market 
capacity to planning policy. The local planning authority had presumed high annual rates of 
completion from allocated sites and had therefore limited the number of sites allocated for housing 
development. This was challenged by the planning consultant for one of Britain’s top 
housebuilders, who argued that “the projections, especially in the light of the current market, are 
unduly optimistic. As an example in urban areas Barratt Newcastle usually work on the basis of 
 
2 Despite the recession, Margaret Beckett, the Minister of State for Housing and Planning, when giving evidence to 
the House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee in October 2008 reiterated the Government 
“target” set in 2007 to see two million new homes built in England by 2016  although referred to the figure of three 
million by 2020 only as an “ambition” (House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, 2009). 
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completing 30 to 50 dwellings annually per site depending amongst other things on the nature of 
a development, its location and the market conditions which at the current time are not easy” 
(Moss, 2007, para 2.14). The planning consultant then went on to challenge the local authority 
planning assumptions site by site, with the extreme example being that one large site that the 
planning authority considered would be built out over five years at the rate of 150, 175, 175, 215 
and 51 per year, which Barratt considered “most unlikely”. 
 
Although the Barker Review of Housing Supply (2004) was primarily concerned to increase the 
overall quantity of new housing development, it considered the pace at which development takes 
place an important associated issue. According to Barker (2004, 109) “While the Review has found 
no compelling evidence of anti-competitive behaviour associated with build-out rates for large 
sites, it considers that it is desirable to ensure that sites are built out at a rate that is socially optimal 
as well as privately optimal for housebuilders.” This theme was taken up in the subsequent Calcutt 
Review of Housebuilding Delivery. Calcutt (2007, 41) commented that “It is almost an article of 
faith, universally held by housebuilders, that there is a limit of 35-50 homes which can be sold 
from one outlet in a single year; to achieve more rapid build-out requires prices to be reduced. . . 
Building out at a faster rate does not yield sufficiently larger early returns to offset the cost of 
discounts plus other marketing and management costs.” Calcutt produced no detailed evidence to 
support this assertion, but recommended that the Government should commission research on 
the issue, especially in relation to large sites. Calcutt (2007, 41) also repeated the commonly held 
perception that “capacity of local housing market to absorb new supply” is limited, an issue 
integrally bound with the build-out rate, to which we now turn.   
 
2.3 The concept of market capacity 
 
It is tempting to think of market capacity simply in volume terms in the sense of a finite number 
of new homes that can be absorbed annually in each housing market area. While most debate 
about market capacity at planning inquiries takes place at this level, it ignores the crucial impact of 
price on capacity. Since speculative housebuilders operate simultaneously in the housing and land 
markets, the way in which housing prices and land prices interrelate is central to unpacking the 
concept of market capacity. 
 
In development appraisal, land prices are considered a residual having deducted predicted 
development costs and desired profit from predicted development revenues (Leishman et al., 
2000). Housebuilders thus start the process of development appraisal by taking a view of the likely 
selling prices of the homes once completed. Since the supply of homes for sale in any area is usually 
dominated (generally around 90%, although this varies over time and by location) by those 
available in the second hand market, it is usually argued that speculative housebuilders are price-
takers in the sense that the price levels in the second hand market determine the maximum price 
at which new houses can be sold (Oxley, 2004). What is not well explored in the literature, and 
here we present new evidence later in the paper, is the precise type of information housebuilders 
seek about the second hand market and the way in which this is balanced against their better 
knowledge of the prices that have been obtained for newly-developed homes by both themselves 
and their competitors. Trading off all this information helps a housebuilder undertaking a 
development appraisal to predict whether eventual selling prices for the newly-completed homes 
will be above, at, or below prevailing prices levels in the second hand market3. 
  
 
3 From a consumer perspective, it can be argued that newly-built homes might command a premium over similar sized 
properties available in the second hand market as a result of their very newness and expected low maintenance. 
However, taking account of likely snagging, continued nearby construction activity and the very real possibility of 
disruptive delays in completion, the reverse might equally be true. 
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This price prediction is critical to any notion of market capacity. At least at the margin, the 
attraction of newly completed homes to potential purchasers will differ dependent on whether 
they are sold at a premium or discount to second-hand homes. This is not simply a matter of the 
extent to which purchasers already in the market can be persuaded to choose newly-built rather 
than second-hand homes. Instead of such a static view of market capacity, we need to think what 
might happen if newly-built homes were discounted or even heavily discounted compared to 
second-hand homes, and then ask why this does not occur. 
 
In theory, we might expect the sale of newly-built homes at a discount to second-hand prices to 
increase the demand both for newly-built homes and for owner-occupied housing as a whole, since 
it would not simply encourage purchasers already in the market to switch to newly-built homes 
but crucially might enable first-time buyers to enter the market earlier (both directly and as its 
impact permeated down the housing ladder). Thus, as far as the housing market is concerned, a 
prima facie case exists to suggest that housebuilders who ‘pitch in’ below rather than at or above 
the price of second-hand homes might gain a competitive advantage in the housing market and, 
in the short term at least, be able to expand their market share. If this strategy was followed by all 
housebuilders, the market share of each individual builder may not change, but crucially, there 
would be some increase in the overall size of the market, dependent on the extent of the discount. 
 
Why does this not happen? Why do speculative housebuilders generally take such a static view of 
overall market capacity and not seek to steal a competitive advantage, at least in the short term, by 
selling their newly-build products at a discount to second hand products? The answer lies in the 
relationship between the housing and land markets and in knowledge that housebuilders who 
sought competitive advantage from adopting a discount strategy in the housing market would soon 
find themselves at a significant competitive disadvantage in the land market, to the extent that it 
would inhibit their ability to acquire land and, in due course, lead them to lose their share of the 
market for newly-built homes. As Oxley (2004, 31) commented “Housebuilders’ expectations 
about the prices at which they can sell houses and the costs of building those houses (not including 
the costs of land) will influence the amount they bid for land. Expectations of higher house prices 
will, other things being equal, increase housebuilders’ bids for land.” The extent to which 
housebuilders are able to maintain or expand their share of the new housing market is thus critically 
dependent on their success in the land market, and not vice-versa. 
 
Where the supply of housebuilding land is limited, either by the planning restrictions or for other 
reasons, but housing demand is strong, the fiercest competition between housebuilders is to gain 
access to land (Adams and Watkins, 2002), safe in the knowledge that once on-site, what is 
eventually built will face only limited competition from other development sites and will not need 
to be discounted substantially below the level of second hand prices to achieve the desired rate of 
sales. Other consequences flow from the fact that the main focus of competition between 
housebuilders, at least in the areas of high housing demand and restricted land supply, is on access 
to land rather than on the sale of homes4. As Barker (2004, 106) remarked: “When land is in 
relatively scarce supply, fewer permissioned sites mean that there will be fewer competing 
housebuilders in any one area. This can reduce consumer choice. In such situations, competition 
focuses on land. Once land is secured, competitive pressures are reduced: to a large extent 
 
4 If housebuilders considered themselves to be in strong competition with each other in the housing market, one 
might expect to see attempts to build a brand identity through national marketing campaigns and television 
commercials. However, despite the importance of housing expenditure to consumers, newly-built housing is 
astoundingly under-represented within the constant stream of television commercial and other national forms of 
advertising. This highlights the importance of competing with the local second-hand market rather than necessarily 
with other housebuilders.    
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housebuilders can “sell anything”. There is therefore less need to compete on output, by offering 
a higher quality product or innovative design features, except in niche markets.” 
 
Although individual housebuilders see bidding prices for land as a residual having deducted 
predicted development costs and desired profit from predicted development revenues, they remain 
acutely conscious that taking too conservative a view of future development revenues would be 
likely to undermine their chances of success in the land market. Indeed, at the outset, successful 
speculative housebuilders need to be bullish enough in their predictions of future revenues to 
enable them to offer more than their competitors for available development sites, although not so 
bullish that their predictions turn out to be unachievable, making completed units saleable only at 
a loss5. This is far from an exact science. While Ball (1999), for example, argued that too much 
optimism in land purchase has historically been a prime cause of company failure in housebuilding, 
Leishman et al (2000), from empirical work on 16 Scottish housing developments, suggested that 
uncertainty about future costs and returns caused housebuilders to pay about 20% less for land 
than might have been the case if they had had perfect foresight.  
 
Two mitigating factors, however, can make this judgement call less difficult than it might otherwise 
appear. The first is a rising housing market, which provides housebuilders with some degree of 
comfort that sales prices when dwellings are completed in two or three years’ time can be expected 
to be above those prevailing at the time of the original development appraisal, and sometimes 
significantly above6. Between the early 1990s and 2007, the UK experienced a continuously rising 
housing market, which led many housebuilders to feel ever more comfortable in their bullish 
predictions of future sales revenues. The subsequent downturn caused a severe reality check for 
the speculative housebuilding industry, with decisions taken to ‘mothball’ development sites, where 
likely sales revenues had fallen so much below the initial predictions that even marginal costs could 
no longer be covered. 
 
State intervention in the supply of land is ironically the second mitigating factor that has made 
housebuilders less worried than they might otherwise have been about bullish predictions of future 
revenues and hence bullish bids for land. When the supply of potential development land is 
restricted by the planning system, housebuilders who capture approved development sites are 
privileged by the limit set by the planning system on potential competition from other sites. Indeed, 
it then becomes easier to programme the housing development process to achieve optimistic 
revenue predictions, once the threat of competition is reduced, by limiting the number of units for 
sale at any one time. In short, our argument is that the concept of market capacity needs to be 
viewed essentially as a ‘commercial construct’ contingent on that particular set of relationships 
between the state and the market which delineate the present structure of speculative 
housebuilding provision. Failure to recognise this helps ensure this construct is embedded within 
the culture of the industry and then transmitted into, and reinforced by, the decision-making 
processes of a planning system,  which sees supply in quantitative terms, but not does readily 
connect quantity to price. 
 
 
5  This principle applies even if land is acquired by private treaty and is never competitively available in the open 
market. This is because most landowners these days tend to well advised by professional consultants who know the 
‘going rate’ for development land. Housebuilders normally succeed in private treaty acquisitions only if their bids are 
known to be competitive in market terms. 
 
6 Housebuilders will, of course, seek to take some account of expected market trends in preparing development 
appraisals for sites they are thinking of purchasing. Those that take the most optimistic view of a rising market may 




If we are to challenge the view that local housing markets have an absolute or finite capacity to 
absorb new development, it is thus essential to know more about the construction, sales and 
pricing strategies of the major housebuilders. The above review suggests the need to address four 
main research questions, which we consider in the Section 4, having first explained our research 
method. These questions are: 
 
1. When housebuilders estimate gross development value, and hence decide how much to 
bid for land, how do they determine eventual selling prices for completed units? 
2. What is the relationship between predicted sales prices, sales rates, market capacity and 
construction rates? 
3. How do housebuilders react to change in market demand once construction has begun? 
4. Do planners have any influence over the speed at which housebuilders develop approved 
sites? 
 
3.  RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The research for this paper was undertaken in early 2008 for the UK Government (Adams and 
Leishman, 2008). At that time, early signs of a slowdown in housebuilding were already evident 
but almost no-one we interviewed anticipated the scale of the downturn experienced later that 
year. Our findings reflect what we can now recognise as the prevailing industry wisdom at the end 
of a long upward period in the fortunes of the housing market rather than the turbulence of the 
severe recession that followed. We would argue, however, that this proviso does not invalidate our 
results, even though their applicability may have been put on temporary hold. Unless a 
fundamentally different structure of housebuilding provision emerges out of the recession (and 
there is yet little hard evidence that it will), our main findings are likely to be just as relevant when 
and if the fortunes of the speculative housebuilding industry begin to recover. 
 
Although there are over 20,000 housebuilders registered with the National House Building Council 
(NHBC), our research concentrated on housebuilders producing 250 or more units per annum, of 
which there were 45 operating in England in 2005 as listed in the industry league tables compiled 
by Wellings (2005). As previously indicated, such firms build the vast majority of new British 
homes. To obtain both comparative data across the industry as well as more in-depth information 
on individual housebuilders, we first asked all companies to complete a standard structured 
questionnaire and followed this up with semi-structured interviews among a smaller number. 
Almost all the respondents to both the questionnaire and interview were at least at Director level 
in their respective companies, with occasional responses received at Chief Executive level. 
 
Some 18 replies were received to the standard questionnaire sent by email to the 45 target 
companies - a 40% response rate. Bearing in mind the much greater difficulties of undertaking 
research on the private development industry in comparison with the public sector, this was 
certainly a good response.  The 18 housebuilders who responded to our survey built 52,290 new 
dwellings in 2005 (according to Wellings’ figures) equivalent to almost a third of the 159,480 new 
dwellings completed in England that year. The respondents were also broadly representative of 
the structure of the industry as a whole since they comprised six volume builders (each with an 
annual output in excess of 2,000 units) seven medium-sized builders (each with an annual output 
between 501 and 2,000 units) and five smaller builders (each with an annual output between 250 
and 500 units). Respondents therefore ranged from, at the top end, two out of the UK’s three 
‘super-builders’ (those producing in excess of 10,000 units annually) down to a small private 




The questionnaires were followed up by detailed telephone interviews with eight of the 
respondents as well as a face-to-face interview with representatives of the Home Builders 
Federation in London. The telephone interviewees were again evenly spread by size to provide 
representation reflecting the 45 housebuilders operating in England.  
 
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
In this section, we seek to address the four research questions specified at the end of Section 2. 
These concerned the way in which housebuilders determine selling prices, the influence of these 
on sales rates, market capacity and construction rates, the reaction of housebuilders to subsequent 
changes in market demand and whether planners can influence production rates. 
 
4.1 Determining selling prices 
 
The second-hand market is often portrayed as providing a benchmark for pricing newly built 
homes. But in interpreting this benchmark, do housebuilders ‘pitch-in’ slightly above or below 
prevailing prices for similar second-hand homes? Golland and Boelhouwer (2002) suggest this 
depends on whether newly-built products are significantly better than second-hand ones. In 
contrast, our research indicates that this depends critically on the extent and nature of competition 
from other housebuilders. One company interviewed highlighted a major urban expansion in the 
south-west of England, where 35 builders were in competition within a single housing market area. 
This resulted in prices pitched below the second hand market. Another believed that increased 
competition between builders in a ‘finite market’ induces price caution. A third interviewee drew 
attention to a 1,200-unit scheme in southern England, where several developers all built similar 
family-type housing, arguing that “The market was swamped and sales virtually ground to a halt. To gain 
maximum advantage from splitting (large sites among several builders), products on adjacent sites should be 
quite distinct.”  But a fourth suggested that even with different products on offer at nearby sites 
“there is a limit to the likely numbers of purchasers in any location.”  
 
In contrast, as one interviewee pointed out “Sites without immediate competition have a distinct 
advantage and compete only with second hand market.” This seems to encourage builders to form 
more optimistic price expectations, for, as another interviewee put it: “Second hand housing in the 
market is a minimal factor. If you were in good area with strong market you would set the bar a bit higher in terms 
of your own expectations.” In the UK, the planning system has a crucial impact on the extent of 
competition that housebuilders face from each other in any locality. Where land release and 
potential competition is restricted, builders become more bullish in the prices they think they can 
achieve for completed homes in the housing market. This produces the higher gross development 
values essential to winning land where intense competition for the limited supply creates a tight 
land market. 
 
When this happens, the planning system acts a gatekeeper to success in the housebuilding industry. 
Those builders who succeed in the competitive land market can then move on to the housing 
market, knowing that potential competition there has been much reduced by the restricted 
availability of land. In such circumstances, builders will ‘pitch-in’ above prevailing prices for similar 
second-hand homes and crucially, as we shall see later, will then manage the release of completed 
units, in the face of limited competition from other development sites, to achieve their own 
optimistic price expectations. In short, where a restrictive planning system makes access to land 





This would not happen if newly-built and second-hand homes were seen as homogeneous 
products. But the housebuilders we interviewed believed in the distinctiveness of newly-built 
homes and concentrated their market research on the new-build sector. One commented that “Our 
attention is focused on recently completed properties and those known to be in the pipeline, rather than on the second 
hand market as a whole.” Another took the view that “Only if there are no prospective new build schemes will 
the company pay full attention to the second hand market. This is because buyers looking for new build form a 
distinct component of demand. Alongside them ‘convenience converts’ can be persuaded to buy new if there is not 
enough decent second hand property available.”  A third stated explicitly that their “target sales rate does not 
account for amount of second hand housing on the market, we only tend to look at the new build sector in terms of 
establishing a sales rate – what are competitors selling, what rate are they selling.” So, although the second 
hand market provides housebuilders with a general benchmark, our research suggests that evidence 
from other new-build or recently completed developments are more important to the precision of 
housebuilders’ price-setting strategies. From a planning perspective, this would suggest that the 
extent of land released is probably a more significant consideration to housebuilders in setting 
new-build prices than previously acknowledged and the second-hand market as a whole (as 
opposed to the more recently completed component of the second hand market) probably less 
significant. Of course, this does not preclude the broader influence of the second-hand market on 
new supply – it simply indicates that housebuilders appear less directly influenced by the second 
hand market than one might well expect. 
 
 
Figure 1: Housebuilders’ mean ratings of information sources used to set selling prices 
 
 
This view is confirmed when we look at the questionnaire results from the 18 housebuilders 
surveyed nationally when asked to specify the importance they attached to seven potential sources 
of information in setting sale prices, on the scale from 1 for ‘no importance at all’ to 5 for 
‘absolutely important’. As Figure 1 shows, housebuilders paid most regard to commissioned 
market research and to sales experience from their own and their competitors’ developments. 
More general information, such as online price databases were less important. In short, 
housebuilders seem not to regard second-hand homes as direct substitutes for their own products 
and consider that this provides some room for manoeuvre in how they price and market newly-
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Informal discussion with industry colleagues, including those in
other companies
Information from local authority, e.g. on potential competing
developments
Online price databases, such as Hometrack
Reports from, and discussion with local estate agents
Sales data about competing developments
Recent sales experience on company’s own sites















1 = No importance at all 5 = Absolutely important
All respondents Smaller housebuilders Medium-sized housebuilders Volume housebuilders
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built homes. Yet, although as one interviewee claimed “Each housebuilder tends to think their products 
are better than the competition”, there is no independent evidence to support this optimistic view of 
the high brand status of newly-built output, especially relative to comparative products in the 
second-hand market. 
 
4.2 The relationship between predicted sales prices, sales rates, market capacity and 
construction rates 
 
A thorough development appraisal undertaken on a cashflow basis will match estimated selling 
prices to a target sales rate. This involves trading off price against sales speed. To sell new homes 
faster, prices must be more competitive. Conversely, to achieve maximum possible prices, more 
time must be allowed to attract purchasers, and crucially, the threat that competitors will enter the 
market and undercut price levels, must be limited. At particular times or locations, making a ‘fast 
sales’ assumption can produce the highest gross development value. One interviewee suggested 
this had happened during the recent apartment building boom, commenting that “if you go into an 
area with a big demand for apartments then you would put a very fast rate of sale on them.” But it appears that 
the usual practice in the industry is to aim for the maximum possible price and accept a slower rate 
of sales. As a different interviewee remarked, “In a buoyant market, developers are willing to put the prices 
up as far as they possibly can.” Another aimed “to pitch at maximum price at the start and then use incentives 
(carpets, white goods etc) if prices need to be reduced.” And yet another directly linked land shortages to 
price maximisation, commenting “that if you’re in an area with little or no new housing so you have a throttle 
on new product.”  
 
If, in constructing their development appraisals, housebuilders push estimated selling prices to 
their maximum in order win the competition for land, then the pace at which a local housing 
market can absorb that new supply will be slower than if more moderate prices had been assumed 
in the development appraisals. For as one interviewee candidly pointed out “Once you have bought the 
site, that rate of sale is set in stone.” What appears to have been common practice in the housebuilding 
industry has been the readiness to take the most optimistic view of price in development appraisal 
so as to enable successful land bids to be made, while remaining much more cautious on sales 
rates.  
 
In the questionnaire, we asked respondents to tell us the optimal average sales rates for two typical 
200 unit developments, one greenfield and one brownfield, comprising mainly 2, 3 & 4 bedroom 
houses  or apartments. The results, shown in Figure 2, suggest an average optimal sales rate of 
about 59 units per annum for greenfield houses and 67 for brownfield apartments. There was 
limited variation around this mean, with most housebuilders setting a target of between 40 and 80 
units built and sold from each outlet annually. Brownfield apartments are usually developed more 
rapidly than greenfield housing because the practicality of apartment construction normally makes 
it impossible to ‘drip feed’ the market or to achieve a slow trickle of sales. With more capital 
employed, speedy construction and sales are essential to contain exposure to borrowing. 
Interestingly, volume developers seem to build apartments faster than smaller and medium-sized 





Figure 2: Imputed Annual Optimal Sales Rates 
 
 
These results confirm the anecdotal and literature evidence that the typical housebuilder aims to 
build and sell around one unit a week7. This common ‘rule of thumb’ within the industry is indeed 
a commercial construct, reflective of the particular institutional structure of housing provision in 
Britain, in which tight regulation of land release endows those who win the competition for land 
with the power to manage the release of newly-built homes to maximise price. One housebuilder 
we interviewed, who had developed 25 houses in an attractive historic town, explained how this 
occurred. Since “there was a very strong market and there was no need to sell too far ahead” only five houses 
were initially released to the market. As soon as these were sold “we were then able to review the sales 
prices for the next five.” Another housebuilder commented with remarkable honesty that “selling out 
sites in phased releases of 6 to 12 houses has its own psychology, i.e. ‘buy now, because you may have to pay more 
for the same product on the next phase’.”  
 
The research findings therefore reinforce and amplify the view of Calcutt (2007, 159) that “The 
housebuilder will always want to sell his product for the best possible price consistent with 
obtaining a given rate of sale. In maximising returns a builder will calculate the combination of 
price and rate of sale that will generate the highest achievable rate of return.”  Crucially, once land 
is purchased and the target rate of sale is set, it drives the target rate of production and not vice-
versa. One interviewee who explained that large development sites are split between builders 
primarily to improve the sales rate, rather than to make construction more efficient, made this 
quite clear: “It’s less about build rates and more about sales rate. By putting more than one builder on a site, you 
are offering more choice to the consumer, therefore opening the site up to more potential customers.” So the speed 
at which sites are developed is determined by target sales, not production efficiency. 
 
Yet, it would thus be mistaken to transform whatever rate of sale is culturally embedded as a ‘rule 
of thumb’ within the industry into some abstract notion of finite market capacity capable of 
retaining its relevance under a different institutional structure of housing provision. Significantly 
 
7 Our results show a slightly faster build-out rate than Calcutt (2007) indicated but nowhere near the ambitions of the 
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faster building rates of up to 150-200 units could still be efficient, according to one volume 
housebuilder we interviewed, although he considered sales at this rate could be achieved only in a 
well-defined urban market and by offering a range of well-differentiated products. But as this 
illustration confirms, market capacity is a context-specific notion that has meaning only in relation 
to particular set of institutional and economic circumstances. 
 
4.3 The reaction of housebuilders to subsequent changes in market demand 
 
What happens if market conditions change once sales have started? Economic theory might 
predict that production rates should increase when demand rises and decrease when it falls. But 
how easily could housebuilders accelerate production in the short term if they wished to do so? 
We identified eight potential constraints that might prevent a short-term increase in production in 
response to improved market conditions. For each constraint, respondents were invited to select 
a number from 1 for ‘likely to be virtually insignificant as a constraint upon increased production’ 
to 5 for ‘likely to be highly significant as a constraint upon increased production’ in the case of a 
typical 200 unit development.  
 
Figure 3 suggests that the four logistical factors at the top of the chart may have some impact, at 
least in the short term, on housebuilders’ ability to increase production, but that none approached 
really high levels of significance. In other words, if the rate of production was determined merely 
by technical considerations, one might expect housebuilders to try hard to increase output when 
demand rises. What actually happens if market conditions improve once sales have started is 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 3: Significance of Constraints to Raising Build Rates in the Short-Term 
 
One comment typified the response of those interviewed to improved market conditions: “If sales 
are going well we will look to increase the sales prices.” Significantly, none of the housebuilders questioned 
would simply increase the construction rate. Some raise prices alone, but most do this alongside 
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responses, price is universally seen as the more flexible. Housebuilders willing to speed up 
construction generally saw this as a marginal reaction and secondary to price. 
 
Figure 4: Housebuilders’ Stated Responses to Higher than Expected Sales 
 
 
A more varied response was evident when housebuilders were asked of their likely reaction if sales 
turned out to be worse than expected but again, as Figure 5 shows, changing the rate of 
construction alone was a rare response. 
 

























































Further insights can be gained from an analysis of the responses to the associated open-ended part 
of the questionnaire (see Figure 6), in which the respondent could list several different courses of 
action. As this confirms, enhanced marketing effort is the most frequently cited example of other 
forms of action likely to be taken in response to poorer than anticipated sales rates. This is followed 
equally by changing the specification and incentives. One interviewee explained the thinking 
behind the uses of incentives (such as paying stamp duty for the buyer) to achieve target sales: “We 
examine it (the sales rate) on a weekly basis, like keeping a train on the track and just nudging it back in-line. 
If a site does fall market-wide on a sustained basis, then we will look at one of these incentives, be it part exchange 
or whatever.” As a last resort, headline selling prices may be cut since as another interviewee put it 
“No builder wants to have completed stock unsold. That would rapidly reduce return on capital.”  
 
 
Figure 6: Developers’ Open-Ended Responses to Lower than Expected Sales Rates 
 
 
These responses very much reinforce the emphasis of interviewees on improving sales during 
difficult times rather than slowing down construction or adjusting target sales rates. In normal 
times, significant changes to the rate of construction are avoided, unless all efforts to stimulate 
demand fail. One smaller builder neatly summarised the importance placed by most housebuilders 
on cashflow, as follows: 
 
“If our pricing is wrong we will adjust prices NOT reduce the rate of construction. We would 
only reduce the rate of construction when the market is very slow and sales incentives/price 
reductions will not increase the rate of sale. It’s all about lock-up of capital . . . Slowing a site 
down in response to a weak market is a last resort because the lock-up of capital will erode the 
net profit.” 
 
Since the empirical research was completed, the credit crunch and recession has created the worst 
crisis for the British housebuilding industry in the postwar period, with many companies 
dependent on lender support for survival, developments halted and extensive landholdings 
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market has been severely affected by the credit crunch. Both the net balance of site visits and 
reservations were around 80% down by mid-summer 2008 on the previous year, according to the 
Homebuilders Federation. Total UK housing starts in 2q, 2008 were 51% down on the previous 
year. Many sites have been mothballed, thousands of staff laid off and billions wiped off the value 
of housebuilders’ shares.” 
 
The exceptional crisis now facing the industry does not invalidate the research findings, since 
unless a fundamentally different structure of housing provision emerges from the recession (and 
serious evidence of this is still awaited) it is likely that the future speed of housebuilding will 
continue to be driven by sales rates rather than production possibilities. Indeed, in view of the 
comments made in early 2008 by those interviewed for the research, the subsequent action of 
many housebuilders to ‘mothball’ developments already on site merely confirms how extreme is 
the crisis now facing the industry. 
 
4.4 The extent of planners’ influence on production rates 
 
The final question that this paper seeks to address is whether planners have any influence over the 
speed at which housebuilders develop approved sites. Kate Barker, to whom this issue was 
certainly a concern, suggested that: 
 
“To encourage faster build-out, planning authorities should use their discretion in setting time 
limits on planning permissions and seek to agree an expected build-out rate, as a condition of 
planning permission. If the rate of build-out has not increased appreciably by 2007, subject to 
conditions in the housing market, Government should review all available policy options to address 
this issue.” (Barker 2004: 110) 
 
In contrast, many of the housebuilders who responded to the research took the opportunity to 
argue for the planning system to release substantially more land for housing development. They 
saw the planning system as the source of, rather than the solution to, cautious site development 
rates. One medium-sized builder expressed this view vociferously:  
 
“Do something about the planning regime. That is the only thing! The house building industry is 
incredibly skilful at doing things differently and faster and well, but there is just not enough land 
coming from the planning system. If the Government wants to meet its targets, it’s got to release 
enough land for that to happen, simple as that. That is the only thing. If there was enough land 
going through the planning system for 250,000 houses a year that is what would be getting built. 
So the industry will find a way of getting the labour and doing things differently, and building things 
quicker.” 
 
Taking this argument at face value, it is worth exploring how production rates really would respond 
to expected or actual shifts in land supply. Since predicting actual behaviour in the abstract is 
notoriously difficult, questionnaire respondents were asked to think how they might react to two 
specific policy scenarios. These were: 
 
Scenario A The Government reduces the national brownfield target from 60% to 50%. 
Respondents were asked what impact they thought this would have on the 
speed at which the 3 million new homes the Government wants to see built in 
England by 2020 are actually constructed. 
Scenario B It is known that a particular local planning authority intends to allocate 
significantly more land for housing development over the next ten years. 
Respondents were asked how they thought this might affect the rate of 
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production on those sites in its area where housing development by their 
company is already underway or is about to start. 
 
Questionnaire responses to these two scenarios are shown in Figure 7. As respondents to Scenario 
A were asked to ignore any difference in the speed of planning decisions between brownfield and 
greenfield land, it is likely that the responses given to this scenario reflect the perception that 
development as a whole is less complex at greenfield locations. 
 
 
Figure 7: Perceived Impact of Alternative Policy Scenarios on Housing Production 
 
Although most respondents thought production rates would increase if there was significantly 
more land made available in a locality (Scenario B), very few felt this would be significant. This 
suggests a more complex relationship between overall land supply and sales rates than implied by 
some commentators. For example, one housebuilder interviewed for the research certainly 
considered that planning policies had raised landowners’ expectations, to the detriment of housing 
quality. He thought that local planning authorities should seek to reduce landowners’ expectation 
of value. He added: “To boost land value we try and get as many houses on a site as possible which automatically 
brings us into conflict with the local planning authority. By increasing land supply, land values would drop and be 
able to generate layouts that were more compliant with LPA’s in the first place.” However, another considered 
that “If planning system were to release significantly more land in any locality, this would result in long-term price 
stability rather than price reductions.” 
 
In this paper, we have argued that where land is in short supply and competition between 
developers is intense, housebuilders must assume the highest possible sale prices (and thus gross 
development value) in order to make winning bids for land. Ironically, such bids are viable only 
because the release of land is restricted in aggregate terms by the planning system, while the release 
of houses is managed on a site-by-site basis by the builders themselves to ensure the achievement 
of the target sales rate underpinning the earlier bid for land. Nevertheless, much caution is needed 
before suggesting that planners can readily reverse this linkage. Even if substantially more land 
were to be released, and the industry were to recover fully from the current recession, some 
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Although speculative housebuilders have been largely responsible for the production of new 
homes in the UK, state regulation has played an important role in shaping the institutional 
structure of the industry. Alongside the well-established policy concern with the marketability of 
proposed housing sites, major policy reviews in recent years have placed fresh emphasis on 
increasing the overall supply of housing land and on seeing what can be done to accelerate 
production once development starts. These matters have local as well as national significance, since 
the view is often taken that local housing markets have only limited annual capacity to absorb new 
development. This view has important strategic implications for planning policy since it suggests 
the need to allocate more (and possibly smaller) sites for housing development and to disperse 
rather than concentrate that allocation. 
 
This paper has taken a critical view of the concept of market capacity through connecting the 
normal speed of speculative residential development to the strategies housebuilders adopt to win 
the essential competition for land. The typical strategy of most companies who participated in the 
research was to aim for a build and sales rate of about one unit per week on greenfield sites and 
slightly higher than this on brownfield sites. This pace of development should be seen as a 
commercial construct that reflects the particular institutional structure of the British housebuilding 
industry and not be taken as a ‘natural build-out rate’. Indeed, to achieve the ambitious 
development values necessary to capture land in the first place, it is essential for housebuilders to 
manage the pace of development and so limit the number of new homes available to be sold at 
any one time. Increased demand thus tends to lead to higher prices rather than increased output, 
while, in normal circumstances, decreased demand is addressed through incentives and increased 
marketing, rather than by cutting production. The more recent action of housebuilders to mothball 
development sites already in production demonstrates just how extreme is the current crisis for 
the industry. 
 
We thus answer our first research question by highlighting how the presence or absence of local 
competitive pressures between housebuilders determines selling prices in relation to the second 
hand stock and thus the bids that can be made for land. Put simply, where builders know that the 
future supply of newly-built homes will be limited by restrictive planning policies, they feel both 
the need and the confidence to bid up the price of land. Our second research question can then 
be answered by pointing to the essential role that land supply plays in linking sales prices, sales 
rates, market capacity and construction rates. We have already suggested in answer to our third 
research question that the normal response of housebuilders to market changes is to use the price 
mechanism to manage demand or as one interviewee put it: “Housebuilding a bit like a machine that 
has been set to work at a certain agreed pace – once it’s in operation, you don’t want to interfere with the machine.” 
Finally, in answer to the fourth research question, although it is clear that the concept of market 
capacity reflects the particular structure of British housebuilding provision (in which the planning 
system plays a major part), it should not be presumed that rate of production would rapidly 
increase if significantly more land were to be allocated for development, since the complex 
institutional relations involved in the development of new homes would take some time to adjust 
to such altered circumstances. 
 
We have not sought to speculate what might happen to the speculative housebuilding industry 
after the recession but would caution against those who rush to judgement by contending that the 
present structure of provision is about to give way to something quite different. There will almost 
18 
 
certainly be a fresh round of mergers and takeovers in the industry but unless the fundamentals 
change quite dramatically, much of what we present here will continue to be relevant. The findings 
in this paper thus call for a more rounded understanding among planners and policy-makers of 
the economic drivers of the speculative housebuilding industry and for more thorough analysis 
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